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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20020123-CA

v.
REBECCA CHAMPNEYS,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appealfroma conviction of attempted tampering with evidence in violation
of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-8-510 and 76-4-101 (1999), a third degree felony, in the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 782a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT QF TTO |$SVg QN APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress evidence found
during a warrantless search when detectives, responding to a tip that defendant and her
companion were involved in illegal drug activity, observed defendant's companion conceal
what appeared to be a crack pipe and watched both occupants engaging in other suspicious
behavior?
Factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329, f 5, 37
P.3d 1197 (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the trial court's conclusions of
law based on these facts are reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. McArthur, 2000
UT App 23,112,996 P.2d 555 (quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851,854-55 (Utah 1992)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES
The following constitutional provisions and statutes, relevant to the disposition of this
case, are attached at Addendum A:
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-8 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with tampering with evidence, a third degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-510 (1999), unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(1999), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a third degree felony in violation of
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5 (1999) (R. 2-5).
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search of her
person and motel room (R. 34). The trial court denied the motion (R. 93; 116:24-26).
Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted tampering with evidence and attempted
forgery, a charge stemmingfromunrelated events, reserving herrightto appeal the attempted
tampering with evidence conviction (R. 81 -87; 117:13-14). The court sentenced defendant
2
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to a statutory term, not to exceed five years in prison, but suspended the sentence and placed
defendant on probation (R. 95-96). Defendant timely appealed (R. 98).l
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
On March 13, 2001, Detectives Troy Anderson and Tracy Ita of the Salt Lake City
Police Department investigated a report that a Lisa Corwell and defendant might be '"using
and/or selling narcotics" at a motel (R. 116:2-3,91).3 The informant specifically directed the
detectives to room number 236 at the Motel 6, located at 1990 West North Temple Street in
Salt Lake City (R. 116:2-3).4
1

The caption and jurisdictional statement of defendant's opening brief states that
her appeal isfromconvictions of attempted tampering with evidence and attempted
forgery. Aplt. Br at cover and 1. However, defendant's appeal is onlyfromthe attempted
tampering conviction, as defendant's change of plea statement, the plea colloquy, the
judgment, and the notice of appeal make clear (R. 81,95,98,117:2-3).
2

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court'sfindingsfromthe
suppression hearing. State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994).
3

The trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress was based largely on Detective
Anderson's testimony at the suppression hearing (Findings of Fact and;Conclusions of
Law, "Ruling," R. 91-93, attached at Addendum B). However, it was also based on the
parties' memoranda and Detective Anderson's testimony at the preliminary hearing, a
copy of which was attached to defendant's memorandum in support of his motion to
suppress (R. 26-32, 34-56). At the preliminary hearing, Detective Anderson asserted that
the informant said both Corwell and defendant were involved with illegal drugs (R. 40).
4

The trial court treated the informant as "anonymous," although the evidence was
various on this point (R. 116:24). At the preliminary hearing, Detective Anderson stated
that information concerning Corwell's illegal drug activity camefromCorwell's husband
(R. 48). Also, in his supporting memorandum, defendant stated that the detectives "knew
nothing about the tip except the person stated he was [the co-defendant's] husband" (R.
36). However, at the suppression hearing, Detective Anderson stated that he did not
recall if the informant had identified himself (R. 116:3,9). According to Detective
Anderson, Detective Ita, who did not testify, received the informant's call (R. 116:2).

3
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Based on this information, the detectives went to the motel room and knocked on the
door - "a knock and talk" (116:3). Detective Ita identified himself as "Tracy" and, after
defendant expressed some confusion, Ita responded that he was "Tracy with the Salt Lake
City Police Department" (R. 116:4). Also, in response to defendant's request, Detective Ita
displayed his badge through the peep hole in the door, and Detective Anderson displayed his
badge through an adjoining window (R. 116:4). Detective Anderson testified that there was
a "six to twelve" inch gap between the curtain and the door through which he could see into
the room (R. 116:4). When the officers asked defendant if Corwell was also in the room,
defendant responded negatively (R. 116:5). However, after Anderson observed another
woman in the room, defendant admitted to him that the other woman was, in fact, Lisa
Corwell(R. 116:5).
After the detectives displayed their badges and asked defendant to open the door,
defendant unsuccessfully tried to close the gap in the curtains (R. 116:6). At that point, from
about five to ten feet, Detective Anderson saw Corwell put what he thought was a crack pipe
into a purse and then put it behind the bed (R. 116:4, 15). Anderson testified that he
"initially thought it was a crack pipe. It was a metallic object that looked the size and shape
of a crack pipe" (R. 116:6). On cross examination, Anderson firmly asserted several times
that he "thought it was a crack pipe," consistent with his preliminary hearing testimony (R.
41, 49-50; 116:12). When Detective Anderson later searched the purse, he found only a
spoon (R. 116:12).
Detective Anderson then observed "a lot of movement in the room" - - "[both women]
4
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".

running around the room . . . both [going] into the bathroom [at least three times each]...
putting stuff behind the bed .. . under the bed" (R. 116:4, 7). Defendant's and Cornell's
trips to the bathroom were significant to Detective Anderson because, in his experience,
people in hotels often try to flush narcotics down the toilet (R. 116:7).
The detectives repeatedly asked defendant to open the door (R. 116:3,6,8). Because
she refused, Detective Ita obtained a key from the motel manager, who directed the
detectives to evict the women if they were involved in illegal drug activity (R. 116:7-8).
Even with the key the detectives were unable to enter the room because the women had
engaged the dead-bolt (R. 116:8). When defendant repeatedly refused to open the door,
Detective Ita kicked it open (R. 116:8).
Once inside the room, Detective Anderson applied a twist lock to defendant, arrested
her, and put her in flexible plastic handcuffs (R. 43). Corwell was placed in custody by other
officers (R. 43). In defendant'srightrear pocket, Detective Anderson found a metallic pipe,
which defendant admitted she used to smoke cocaine (R. 43). Defendant became extremely
hostile, demanding to be searched by a female officer (R. 43). When Detective Anderson
learned that a female officer was en route to the scene, he stopped searching defendant (R.
43).
When Officer Patty Roberts arrived, she search both defendant and Corwell (R. 44).
At that point, defendant admitted that she had cocaine on her person (R. 44). Officer Roberts
searched defendant, finding in her bra a twist or baggie and a contact case containing
substances which tested positively for cocaine (R. 44). Officer Roberts also found kleenex
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and a burnt brillo pad in defendant's pants (R. 44). She also found cocaine and drug
paraphernalia on Corwell (R. 53).
While being searched in the bathroom, defendant grabbed some of the cocaine from
the counter, attempting toflushit down the drain (R. 45). A brief struggled ensued (R. 45).
When Officer Roberts asked defendant what had happened to the twist, defendant asserted
that it had fallen down the drain (R. 46). Officer Roberts found the twist in defendant's hand
(R.46).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly upheld a warrantless search of defendant's motel room
because the detectives performing the search had probable cause that defendant was involved
in illegal drug activity and exigent circumstances justified an immediate entry. In addition
to the reliability and content ofthe tip that directed the detectives to the motel room, probable
cause was established when one ofthe detectives observed defendant's companion try to hide
what reasonably appeared to be a crack pipe, followed by defendant's and her companion's
apparent efforts to hide evidence and bar the detectivesfromentering.
Additionally, exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of the motel room.
Defendant and her companion were engaging in behavior that led the officers to reasonably
believe that evidence was being destroyed, precluding their obtaining a warrant in time to
preserve the evidence.

6
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FOUND BY DETECTIVES
DURING A SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S MOTEL ROOM BECAUSE
THE SEARCH WAS SUPPORTED BY BOTH PROBABLE CAUSE
AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
Defendant claims that the police violated her right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures because they lacked both probable cause and exigent circumstances to
search her hotel room. Br. Aplt. 10-16. Contrary to defendant's claim, the search conducted
by the detectives was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, and the trial
court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence found as a result of that
search.
"[P]robable cause alone is never enough to search... and seize without a warrant."
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983). "However, '[a] warrantless search of a
residence is constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent circumstances are
proven." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997) (citations: omitted).
A.

The search was supported by probable cause that
defendant and her companion were engaged in illegal activity.

Probable cause exists where '"the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense is being
committed."' State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, at % 21, _ P.3d _ (quoting State v. Dorsey,
731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986)) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in
7
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original). 'The probable cause determination is based on the 'totality of the circumstances.'"
Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 (citing State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,1187 (Utah App. 1994)). The
appellate court reviews the trial court's underlying findings of fact for clear error; it reviews
the trial court's determination of probable cause for correctness, "giving the trial court a
measure of discretion 'to apply the standard to the particular set of facts in the case.'" Id.
(quoting Nguyen, at 1186).
/.

Based only on their observations of defendant's participation in patently
criminal conduct, the detectives had probable cause to search the motel room.

Defendant argues that the detectives lacked probable cause to enter and search the
premises, based on this Court's analyticframeworkin State v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah
App. 1997) (reasonable suspicion), and State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,37 P.3d 260,
which applies thatframeworkto the determination of probable cause. Aplt. Br. at 11 -14. See
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235-36 (identifying three determinative factors for probable cause
when police are relying on an informant's tip: 1) the "type of tip or informant involved," 2)
"whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support
a stop," and 3) "whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's
report on the informants tip-")- Thatframework,which places a premium on the "tip" which
initiates an official investigation, is inapposite to this case. Here, probable cause was not
based primarily on the tip, but rather on the detectives' observations of defendant's criminal
conductfroma lawful position outside the motel room.
In Valenzuela, this Court stated:

8
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Here, because the State predicates its probable cause argument upon
information received from an informant, "we must examine the 'totality of the
circumstances' to determine whether the informant's tip, together with police
observations, provided probable cause to arrest" Valenzuela. [Emphasis
added.]
Id. at f ll(quoting State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1996) (quoting Gates v.
Illinois, 462 U.S. 213,238,103 S. Ct. 2317,2332 (1983))). "Predicate" means "to affirm or
base upon facts, arguments, conditions, etc." Webster's New World Dictionary 1149 (Coll.
ed. 1957). The record shows that probable cause was hardly based on the tip.
Detectives Anderson and Ita proceeded to the Motel 6 based on a tip that Corwell and
another woman, later determined to be defendant, might be using and/or selling narcotics (R.
116:2-3,91). The trial court gave short shrift to the tip, discussing it in only the first of its
thirteen findings of fact (Ruling, R. 91-93; bench ruling, 116:24-26, attached at Addendum
C). As such, the court implicitly recognized that the tip only initiated the detectives'
investigation. See State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125,1127 (Utah 1977) (officer's overhearing
and viewing suspicious behavior relating to illegal drug use gave rise taduty to investigate).
See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235-36 (holding that police must corroborate anonymous tip). The
court specifically observed, "Had the officers not been able to see into the room then of
course they would not have had therightto enter the room. They couldn't have gotten a
warrant. But what they saw was evidence or what at least Officer Anderson saw, was
evidence of the commission of a crime" (R. 116:25). Thus, the trial court upheld the entry
into the motel room and ensuing search because they were justified by probable cause based
not primarily on the tip, but on the detectives' observations of Corwell's and defendant's
9
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actions in plain view. See State v. 0 'Brien, 959 P.2d 647,649 (Utah App. 1998) ("A seizure
is valid under the plain view doctrine if (1) the officer is lawfully present, (2) the item is in
plain view, and (3) the item is clearly incriminating.") (citation omitted).
Defendant does not claim that Detectives Anderson and Ita violated her rights by
merely speaking with herfromoutside the closed door of her motel room during a "knock
and talk," nor did they (R. 49,116:3). See United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 105960 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 152 (2001) (" Law enforcement officers may encroach
upon the curtilage of a home for the purpose of asking questions of the occupants."); United
States v. Davis, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964) ("Absent express ordersfromthe person
in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct
which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person'srightof privacy, for
anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on thefrontdoor
of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereofwhether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law.") The trial court
found that a tip that drugs were being dealtfroma motel room "certainly gives the officers
therightto go over and knock on the door and talk with people if the people want to talk with
them," a finding defendant does not dispute (R. 116:24).
Further, defendant does not dispute that the crack pipe Detective Anderson saw and
defendant's highly suspicious conduct was in his plain view and, therefore, thefruitof an
legal search. "It is well established law that a government official does not engage in a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if he observes incriminating evidencefroma
10
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place where he has arightto be." State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983) (finding
lawful right to observe "extends to . . .frontdoors and other open areas accessible to the
public at large."); United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1993) ("We have
held that officers walking up to thefrontdoor of a house can look inside through a partially
draped open window without conducting a Fourth Amendment search."); United States v.
Hersh, 464 F.2d 228,230 (9th Cir.) (viewing inculpatory evidence of illegal drug activity in
plain view through partially curtained windows of residence not an illegal "search" within
purview of Fourth Amendment), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1008,1059-60,93 S. Ct. 442 (1972).
Consequently, defendant does not dispute the well-established rule that, assuming exigent
circumstances, police may seize incriminating evidence observed in plain view.
Rather, defendant challenges the trial court's findings and conclusions, arguing that
what the detectives observed was not incriminating — that it did not constitute probable cause
to break into the motel room and to search. Aplt. Br. at 14. That argument runs counter to
the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact and sound conclusions of law.
Detective Anderson consistently testified, both at the preliminary hearing and at the
hearing on the motion to suppress, that he saw Lisa Corwell try to conceal what he believed
was a crack pipe (R. 27, 35,41; 116:4, 6, 11-12). The trial court correctly recognized that
although Detective Anderson was apparently wrong about actually seeing a "crack pipe," the
error was immaterial because his belief was reasonable:
It turned out he was wrong as to this spoon that turned out to be a spoon when
he thought it was a crack pipe[,] but I don't find anything inherently
unreasonable about that observation or that conclusion that he reached, even
11
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though it was wrong. Whether it's right or wrong is not important. It's what
he reasonably thought it was at the time . . . and I'm satisfied that Officer
Anderson, by what he saw, thought that he observed a [sic] drug paraphernalia.
(R. 116:25).5 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2 (e), at 37 (3d ed. 1996)
noting probable cause may be supported by a reasonable mistake) (citing Maryland v.
Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87, 107 S. Ct 1013, 1018 (1987) (recognizing "the need to allow
some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult
process of making arrests")); United States v. Gonzales, 969 F.2d 999,1004 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that officer's identification of the defendant's wife acting suspiciously "was
ultimately found to be mistaken does not detract from the contribution this impression - //
his mistake was objectively reasonable -made at thetimeto the totality of the circumstances
leading to probable cause"); State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685,691 (Utah App. 1993) (plain view
test for "clearly incriminating" evidence requires "an officer must only have a reasonable
belief 'that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a
crime; it does not demand any showing that such belief be correct'") (citations omitted),
abrogated on other grounds, State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857 (Utah 1994).
It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to "use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to . . . ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the
human body." Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5 (1999). When Detective Anderson saw Corwell

5

The State does not concede that Detective Anderson was mistaken. Although
only a spoon was found in the purse, a crack pipe was found in defendant's pocket (R. 43;
116:12).
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attempt to hide the "crack pipe," he saw her engaged in illegal activity. At that point, the
detectives were justified in arresting and searching Corwell. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2
(1999) ("A peace officer may..., without warrant, arrest a person: (1) for any public offense
committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer;" or (3) when he has reasonable
cause to believe the person has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for
believing the person may . . . (b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the
offense).
Defendant's actions also justified the detectives in arresting her as a party to Corwell's
illegal activity and searching her.6 See State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220,227-28 (Utah App.
1995) (finding probable cause to arrest and search incident to arrest for possession of
marijuana upon the defendant's evasive conduct and attempt to hide something and
experienced officer's detecting odor of marijuana, which defendant denied smoking).
The trial court findings, undisputed by defendant, are that at essentially the same time
that Corwell put the "crack pipe" into her purse, "fbjoth defendants were running around the
room, putting items into bags and under the bed and making several trips to the bathroom"
(R. 92). From the bench, the court observed,
Then, when I add to [Detective Anderson's belief that he saw a crack
pipe] the fact that when they . . . identified themselves as police officers, the
activity starts in the room that is consistent, may be consistent with cleaning

6

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999) ("Every person, acting with the mental
state required for the commission of the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes
an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.")
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up the room[J but that doesn't make sense. It's much more consistent under
the circumstances, and at that point in time, with disposing of controlled
substances. The officer testified that in his opinion, and it doesn't take a
rocket scientist to know that, because controlled substances are disposable by
flushing them down the toilet. There's a lot of activity, moving things about,
going back and forth. All of that gives probable cause to enter the room and
it also, because of the nature of the conduct, provides the sufficient exigent
circumstances to kick in the door.
(R. 25-26). The trial court also found that defendant refused to open the door and applied
a deadbolt even after the detectives told her that they would force it open (R. 92). In sum,
the detectives' direct observations of defendant's criminal conduct sufficiently support the
trial court's conclusion that there was probable cause to believe defendant was involved in
illegal drug activity. Applying the MulcahylValenzuela analysis only strengthens that
conclusion.
2.

The informant's tip, taken with Officer Anderson's observations,
amply established probable cause enter and search the motel room.

As noted above, this Court in Valenzuela applied its analysis of reasonable suspicion
to justify a traffic stop in Mulcahy, to determine probable cause when the police rely on an
informant's tip: 1) the "type of tip or informant involved," 2) "whether the informant gave
enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support a stop," and 3) "whether the
police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's report on the informants tip."
Valenzuela 2001 UT App 332, at 115.. at 235, 236. This Court found its approach in
weighing these factors, "consistent with the recent Utah Supreme Court decision embracing
the 'totality of the circumstances' analysis articulated in Gates," Id. at f 17 (citing State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,1233 (Utah 1996)). See State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, f21,
14
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40 P.3d 1136 (holding that minimal corroboration of the informant's tip was sufficient
because the reliability of the information was high); Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, at f31
(finding under the totality of the circumstances that a police officer did not have probable
cause to arrest the defendant because information supplied by the informant was insufficient
by itself and the officer had not corroborated the report).
In this case, the strength of probable cause grows with consideration of each
successive factor, until, as argued at Point I.A.l, above, the detectives' direct observations
fully and independently confirm the tip, that defendant and her companion were engaged in
illegal activity involving narcotics. See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 ("The officer may
corroborate the tip . . . by observing the illegal activity[.]") (citation omitted).
ThefirstMulcahy factor - the informant 's identity
Mulcahyfirstlooks at the identity of the informant. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. In
Mulcahy, the police informant was an ordinary citizen who identified himself to police
dispatch. Id. at 233. This Court held that an "ordinary citizen-ififormant needs no
independent proof of reliability or veracity. Id. at 235 (quotations and citations omitted).
This is because a citizen informant volunteers information, not for personal benefit, but out
of concern for the community and because an identified citizen informant is exposed to
liability if the information is false. Id.
In this case, the classification of the informant is unclear. While Detective Anderson
clearly testified at the preliminary hearing that the tip camefromCorwell's husband, he was
unable at the suppression hearing to recall whom the tip camefrom(R. 48; 116:3, 9). The
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trial court treated the tip an "anonymous" (R. 91; 116:24). Although an anonymous tip is
"toward the lower end of the reliability scale," it may still support a finding of probable cause
in when balanced with the other circumstances. Anonymous tips have an important place in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. "[S]uch tips,. particularly when supplemented by
independent police investigation,frequentlycontribute to the solution of otherwise 'perfect
crimes.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 237-38,103 S. Ct. at 2334-36 (finding probable caused where
anonymous tip was detailed and substantially corroborated by police investigation). Here,
like the citizen informant in Mulcahy, there is no evidence that the informant stood to gain
by supplying the police with information. Moreover the reliability of the anonymous tip was
augmented by its detail and ultimate corroboration.
The second Mulcahy factor - the level of detail supplied by the informant
The second factor in the Mulcahy analysis is the level of detail given by the informant.
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. In Mulcahy, the informant told the police that a drunk individual,
possibly named "Joe," had been at the informant'sfrontdoor and had driven away in a white
car, "maybe" a Toyota Celica. Id. at 233. He also told the dispatcher the direction the car
was headed and supplied, what he believed was, "Joe's" phone number. Id. This Court
found that the informant "supplied sufficient detail to support a stop and detention," even
though the officer observed no traffic violations or signs of intoxication. Id. at 234, 238.
In a pre-Mulcahy case, the Utah Supreme Court found probable cause for a roadside
arrest and vehicle search on details given in a tip comparable to those in Mulcahy. See
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233. In that case, the defendant's girlfriend reported to the police
16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that the defendant had gone to Las Vegas to purchase methamphetamine. Id. at 1230. She
also told police that the defendant and a companion would be returning to Millard County
the following afternoon, in the defendant's Cadillac, via highway 257. Id. She then
indicated that the defendant might be armed. Id. The following day, a second, confidential
informant, confirmed the information the defendant's girlfriend had given the police. Id.
The court found that the reliability of the girlfriend's statement was high because she
supplied a substantial amount of detail. Id. at 1233. Additionally, her statement was verified
in almost every aspect by the second informant. Id.
The detail supplied by the informant in this case is comparable to that in Mulcahy and
Anderson. In this case, Lisa Corwell's husband told dispatch that "Lisa and Rebecca[,
defendant,] were in room 236" of the Motel 6 located at 1990 North Temple in Salt Lake (R.
40; 116:2-3). The informant told the police that these women were "engaging in illegal
activity - either using or selling narcotics" (R. 34; 116:2). Like the officers in both Mulcahy
and Anderson, the detectives were told the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the number
of possible suspects engaged in the illegal activity, the precise location of crime and the
suspects, and the type of criminal behavior those suspects were engaging in. Although, the
informant did not state his basis of knowledge concerning the information, the detectives
would reasonably have relied on a family member's report presumably based on first-hand
observation. See Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, at f 19 (family member's tip concerning the
defendant's use of a methamphetamine lab significant because it based on personal
observation); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 238 (crediting informant's tip about drunk driver because
17
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it was evidently based on first hand observations). In sum, the informant's tip was
sufficiently detailed to support a finding of probable cause when supplemented with the
detectives'corroborating observations.
The third Mulcahy factor - the police officer's confirmation of the tip
"The officer may corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal activity or by
finding the person, the vehicle and the location substantially as described by the informant."
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (citation omitted). In Mulcahy, the tip alerted police to an alleged
drunken driver, but the investigating officer did not observe signs of intoxication in the
defendant's driving pattern. Id. at 233. Consequently, this Court focused on the second
means of corroboration, the confirmation of the "innocent details" to establish the tip's
reliability. Id. at 236 (citing State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 340 (N.H. 1995)). Since
criminals naturally tend to hide their illegal activity, Utah courts have regularly taken the tack
used in Mulcahy. See Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233 (concluding that because "officers had
personally verified every aspect of the informants' reports except whether [the defendants]
were actually transporting methamphetamine..., the police could justifiably conclude that
the rest of the reports would also be true"); DeLuna, 2001 UT App 401, at f20 (recognizing
difficulty ofconfirming tip about family member's methamphetamine lab where police could
not observe the alleged illegal activity or the facts provided by informants without entering
the defendant's apartment); State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 516, 518 (Utah App. 1992)
(upholding probable cause to support search warrant where police confirmed all information
supplied by informant except that pertaining to physical evidence of drug use and
18
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manufacture).
Lacking direct observations of illegal conduct, this Court has held that
"[cjorroboration by the police officer means, in light of the circumstances, [that] he confirms
enough facts so that he may reasonably conclude that the information provided is reliable."
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (quoting State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tex. App. 1995))
(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, Utah's appellate courts have found official
corroboration of a tip sufficient on far slimmer facts than in this case. See Anderson, 910
P.2d at 1233 (the defendant's name, vehicle make, route, destination, date and time of
departure and arrival); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 237-38 (vehicle color, route, direction of travel,
time of departure); Purser, 828 P.2d at 518 (the defendant's address, vehicle registration,
police record, foot traffic to andfromthe defendant's house).
In contradistinction to those cases referenced above, the detectives in this case
corroborated the reliability of the tip not only by confirming all of the innocent details, but
also by observing defendant's illegal conduct. The tip informed Detectives Anderson and Ita
that defendant and Lisa Corwell were involved in illegal drug activity in room 236 at the
Motel 6 at 1990 North Temple in Salt Lake City (R. 40; 116:2-3). The detectives went to the
motel room identified by the informant and confirmed that two females were in the motel
room and that one of those women was Corwell (R. 116:3-5). In accord with the trial court's
findings, the State acknowledges that at this point the detectives lacked probable cause to
search (R. 116:25). However, Detective Anderson contemporaneously observed defendant
and Corwell involved in plainly illegal drug-related activity, hiding drug paraphernalia. See
19
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Aple. Br. at Pt. I.A.I, above. In sum, the totality of the detectives' observations amply
confirmed the reliability of the tip and supported probable cause to both arrest and search
defendant and Corwell.
B.

Defendant's behavior created exigent circumstances,
justifying the warrantless search of the motel room.

The Fourth Amendment adopts a "strong preference for searches conducted pursuant
to a warrant." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983). Thus,
"searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."
Paytonv. New York,445 U.S. 573,586, lOOS.Ct. 1371,1380(1980); CityofOrem v. Henri,
868 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App. 1994). However, "[police entry into a house without a
warrant is not [ ] always unreasonable/' Murdoch v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir.
1995).
One exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent circumstances exception.
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 n.3,104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630 n.3 (1984). Under this
exception, a warrant is not required if the circumstances "involve[ ] a plausible claim of
specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances.'" Illinois
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331,121 S. Ct. 946, 950 (2001). In these circumstances, "'the
exigencies of the situation* make the need of law enforcement so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,393-94,98
S. Ct. 2408,2414 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,456,69 S. Ct.
191,193 (1948)). "Exigent circumstances exist 'only when the inevitable delay incident to
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obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action.'" State v. Wells,
928 P.2d 386,389 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 844
(11th Cir.1984)), affd 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997).
664

While "exigent circumstances" have multiple characteristics, the guiding principle

is reasonableness, and each case must be examined in the light of facts known to officers at
the time they acted.'" Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1391 (quoting State v. Hert, 220 Neb. 447, 370
N.W.2d 166, 170 (Neb. 1985)); see also Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388 (holding that "[t]he
determination of exigency is based on the totality of the circumstances").
"Numerous cases have sustained warrantless entries where the circumstances
indicated that evidence might be destroyed or removed if entry was delayed until a warrant
could be obtained." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255,1258,1259 n.10, (Utah 1987) (citations
omitted). See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-8 (1999) (authorizing a police officer to break the
door or window of a building to arrest a person reasonably suspected of committing any
public offense "where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed"). In
Ashe, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a suspected drug dealer's house
based on probable cause and exigent circumstances that contraband would be destroyed if
the police did not act immediately and before a warrant could be obtained. Id. at 1258-59.
The evidence in support of exigent circumstances in this case is even weightier than in Ashe.
In Ashe, officers arrested at a parking lot two codefendants, suspected of being
defendant's middlemen, after an undercover officer made a small, initial purchase of cocaine
in what was intended to be a still larger drug deal. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1257. Based on their
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surveillance and voluntary statements of the middleman, officers knew that the defendant's
residence was only two to five minutes from the parking lot and that he expected his
middlemen to "quickly" return to expedite another, larger, purchase. Ashe, 745 P.2d at
1257. Consequently, the officers were concerned that the defendant would become
suspicious and destroy the remaining cocaine when his accomplices did not return. Id.
When officers arrived at Ashe's home, one of them saw Ashe look out an upstairs window
and then move away. Id. After knocking and identifying themselves, and briefly waiting for
a response, the officers kicked open thefrontdoor. Id. Upon entering the residence, the
officers heard a toilet flush and saw two bags containing white residue in the wastebasket
near the toilet. Id. The court found that the "urgency of the situation escalated" with each
of the subsequent events and there was "no realistic opportunity to seek a search warrant
before the exigencies of the matter made it necessary to enter the dwelling." Id. at 1259,
1260. The court added that the officers did not have to eliminate all innocent explanations
for the behavior they observed, "so long as the explanation advanced by the . . . agents to
support the search appealed] in all probability to be correct" Id. at 1261 (quoting U.S. v.
Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1972)) (first alteration in original).
In this case, Detectives Anderson and Ita arrived at the motel room on a tip that
Corwell and defendant were involved in illegal drug activity (R. 116:2-3). At the motel room
door they knocked and identified themselves (R. 116:3-4). At the same time, Detective
Anderson observed Corwell attempt to hide what appeared to be a crack pipe (R. 116:4).
Also, immediately after the detectives identified themselves, Detective Anderson observed
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defendant and Corwell "running in the room, putting stuff behind the bed and running to and
from the bathroom" (R. 116:6). He saw the women go to the bathroom "at least three times"
(R. 116:7). Defendant's hurried activity was particularly significant to Detective Anderson
because, in his experience, suspects, especially in hotel rooms, will try to flush narcotics
down the toilet to destroy them (R. 116:7).
The foregoing record established probable cause and exigent circumstances for the
detectives to enter the motel room without a warrant. See Aplt. Br. at Pt. I.A. 1. As the trial
court correctly concluded, there was reason for the detectives to believe that defendants were
in the act of destroying controlled substances (R. 93; 116:26). Indeed, the detectives' sense
of the exigency was more reasonable than those of officers in Ashe. In Ashe, the defendant's
apparent attempt to destroy incriminating evidence could only be reasonably assumed, Ashe,
745 P.2d at 1265, whereas in this case those attempts were actually observed.
In sum, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
CQNClVStQN
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this Court
affirm defendant's conviction.

w
On

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J_

day of August, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

'

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission
of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers.
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any
peace officer, "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any device
that enhances the acuity; sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or
records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe
that the person arrested has committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person
may.
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
person.

77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, when.
To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in all cases,
a peace officer, may break the door or window of the building in which the
person to be arrested is, or in which there are reasonable grounds for believing
him to be. Before making the break, the person shall demand admission and
explain the purpose for which admission is desired. Demand and explanation
need not be given before breaking under the exceptions in Section 77-7-6 or
where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed.
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DAVID E.YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

'.

:

I

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

-v.-

I
Case No. 011905093

REBECCA CHAMPNEYS,
Hon. Timothy R. Hanson
Defendant.

|

This matter came on for a Motion to Suppress hearing on September 19, 2001,
before the Court, the Honorable Timothy R Hanson, District Court Judge, presiding.
The State was represented by Deputy District Attorney Lana Taylor. The Defendant was
present and represented by David Finlayson. Evidence was presented in the form of
testimonyfromDetective Troy Anderson. The Court, based upon the evidence and
argument presented at the hearings, the memorandums of law submitted by counsel, and
for good cause shown, makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On March 13,2001, Salt Lake City Detective Troy Anderson and other

officers investigated a report that Defendant Corwell was involved in using or selling
illegal drugs in a motel room, located at 1990 West North Temple, in Salt Lake County.
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2.

The officers knocked on the door of the motel room and asked if

defendant Corwell was present.
3.

Defendant Champneys spoke to the officers through the door and said that

Corwell was not there.
4.

Detective Anderson could see into the room through the window and saw

both Defendants Champneys and Corwell.
5.

Defendant Corwell then told the officers that she was in the room.

6.

The officers identified themselves and asked if they could enter the room.

7.

Through the window, Detective Anderson saw Defendant Corwell put

what appeared to be a black crack pipe into a purse, which was on the bed. Corwell then
put the purse behind the bed. Both defendants were running around the room, putting
items into bags and under the bed and making several trips to the bathroom.
8.

The officers asked the defendants to open the door, and the defendants

9.

The officer told the defendants that if they did not open th? door, they

refused.

would have to force the door open and the defendants again refused to open the door.
10.

One of the officers received a key to the room from the manager of the

motel, who said that he wanted the defendants "kicked out.'9
11.

The officers tried to use the key to enter the room, but the door was dead-

12.

The officers kicked the door in and arrested the defendants for interfering

bolted.

with a police investigation.
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13.

Defendants Champneys and Corwell were searched and officers found the

evidence in this case, which consisted of cocaine and drug paraphernalia.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The officers had probable cause to believe that drug activity was occurring

in the room as a result of the information they were provided and the facts, which
confirmed that information.
2.

The officers had exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry into

the motel room as a result of the defendants' actions, which indicated that they were
concealing and destroying evidence.
3.

The evidence in this case was lawfully seized pursuant to the probable

cause and exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
DATED this ^

day of

iQjiL/

Approved as to Form:

Finlavson
Attorney for the Defendant
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone. (801)363-7900
IN THE THIRD RJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,
-v.-

Case No. 011905093
REBECCA CHAMPNEYS,
Hon. Timothy R Hanson
Defendant.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is
denied.
DATED this

day of.

JUDGE
Approved as to Form:

David Finlayson
Attorney for the Defendant
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information that drug activity is going on, they see things
that confirm that, probable cause that there's drug activity in
that room and the exigent circumstances are created when these
individuals in the room start hiding things.

Hiding things in

purses, hiding purses behind beds, running back to the
bathroom.

In their experience as narcotics officers, that is

very consistent with things they've seen in the past destroying
evidence.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Submit the matter?
MR. ANDERSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

MR. FINLAYSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

I think I'm ready to rule on this one.

Like most of these matters, what happens in the information,
whether it's corroborated or it comes from an anonymous source,
builds as the time goes along.

So that's why I'm required to

look at the totality of the circumstances.
Here we have an anonymous tip that there's drug
dealing going on in this room where apparently the defendant, I'll get everybody's name right here - Lisa Corewell is in the
room.

That certainly gives the officers the right to go over

and knock on the door and talk with people if the people want
to talk to them and they did that and they also confirmed,
which gives support to the anonymous tip, is that Lisa
Corewell, ultimately, she was in the room and so therefore, we
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1

haven't just got somebody making a phone call.

We've got

2

somebody making a phone call with some information that appears

3

to be at least as far as that's concerned, correct.

4

Had the officers not been able to see into the room

5

then of course they would not have had the right to enter the

6 j room.

They couldn't have got a warrant.

But what they saw was

7

evidence or what at least Officer Anderson saw, was evidence of

8

the commission of a crime.

9

this spoon that turned out to be a spoon when he thought it was

It turned out he was wrong as to

10

a crack pipe but I don't find anything inherently unreasonable

11

about that observation or that conclusion that he reached, even

12

though it was wrong.

13

important.

14

That would be like saying, Well, they didn't know there were

15

drugs but they found them, therefore, it's okay.

16

accept that either.

17

that's important or what's actually found, but what is

18

reasonably in the minds of the person at the time and I'm

19

satisfied that Officer Anderson, by what he saw, thought that

20

he observed a drug paraphernalia.

21 j

Whether it's right or wrong, is not

It's what he reasonably thought it was at the time.

We don't

So, it's not the product of the search

Then, when I add to that the fact that when they

22 , identified them as police officers, identified themselves as
23

police officers, the activity starts in the room that is

24

consistent, may be consistent with cleaning up the room but

25

that doesn't make sense.

It's much more consistent under the
25
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1

circumstances, and at that point in time, with disposing of

2

controlled substances.

The officer testified that in his

3 ; opinion, and it doesn't take a rocket scientist to know that,
4

because controlled substances are disposable by flushing them

5

down the toilet.

6

about, going back and forth.

7

to enter the room and it also, because of the nature of the

8

conduct, provides the sufficient exigent circumstances to kick

9

in the door.

10

There's a lot of activity, moving things
All of that gives probable cause

If the exigent circumstances weren't there, they

11

would have had to get a warrant.

12

enough to get a warrant based on what was expressed to that

13

point in time and what was observed.

14

give them the right to kick in the door when it's bolted even

15

though they - have the key makes no difference.

16

the key makes no difference, but not being able to get in even

17

with the key, they had the right to kick down the door because

18

I think it's reasonable to believe that they thought that there

19

were controlled substances being destroyed.

20

the motion is denied.

21

there's exigent circumstances.

22

trial.

23
24
25

MS. TAYLOR:

I'm satisfied there was

The exigent circumstances

Who gave them

And so, therefore,

There's probable cause and I believe
So let's set the matter for

Your Honor, would you like the State to

prepare findings, conclusions in an order?
THE COURT:

Please.
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